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I Which micro- or macro-prudential banking regulations are
beneficial to financial stability?
I Prevention and mitigation policies:
I How to prevent severe downturns from occurring?
I How to mitigate the cumulative economic losses?
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Mechanisms in the model
Capital Adequacy Requirement
Reserve Ratio Requirement
Mechanisms in the model
1. Probability of Default (PD): Internal Risk-Based approach (IRB)
2. Interest rate rule for commercial banks
3. Debt-equity transformation: Insolvency / Illiquidity
4. Dividend payout rule
5. Credit rationing rule
6. Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR)
7. Central Bank Reserve Ratio Requirement (RRR)
8. Future research: Capital Conservation Buffers & Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffers:





Mechanisms in the model
Capital Adequacy Requirement
Reserve Ratio Requirement
Probability of Default, Interest rate rule





t }, ν = 0.1




1 +λB ·PDft + εbt
)
, εbt ∼ U[0,1]
rECB = 0.01
λB = 3: penalty rate for high-risk firm, uniform across banks
εbt : bank’s ideosyncratic operating costs









1. Risk-exposure of credit request (Expected Loss at Default):







PDkt ·Lkt , (1)
2. Constraint 6: Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR)
RWAbt ≤ α ·Ebt , α ≥ 0 (2)
3. Risk-exposure "budget" of the bank:
V bt := α ·Ebt −RWAbt (3)
4. Risk-constrained loan demand:
¯`b
it =
 Lit if PDit ·Lit ≤ V
b
t
0 if 0≤ V bt ≤ PDit ·Lit
0 if V bt < 0.
(4)









I Constraint 7: Reserve Ratio Requirement (RRR)
Mbt ≥ β ·Depbt , β ∈ [0,1] (5)
I Excess liquidity "budget" of the bank:
W bt := M
b
t −β ·Depbt (6)




i ,t if W
b
t ≥ ¯`bi ,t
φ · ¯`bi ,t if 0≤W bt ≤ ¯`bi ,t
0 if W bt < 0.
(7)
Possibility of credit rationing: {φ : W bt −φ · ¯`bi ,t = 0}→ φ = W bt /¯`bi ,t
I Illiquid banks stop lending to all firms (bank lending channel)
I Risky firms cannot get loans (borrower’s balance sheet channel)






Prevention and mitigation: The Limits to Credit Growth
Parameter sensitivity analysis



















1.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 32.0
α-sensitivity: Cap. Adq. Req.
I Default: α = 32 (3%)
I Lower: amplitude of recessions
increases



















0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50
β -sensitivity: Reserve Req.
I Default: β = 0.05 (5%)
I Higher: amplitude of recessions
decreases
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Prevention and mitigation: The Limits to Credit Growth
Parameter sensitivity analysis
α-sensitivity: Cap. Adq. Req.
I Basel III: 4.5−10.5%
α = 22.2−9.5







































β -sensitivity: Reserve Req.
I EU: β = 0.01, US: β = 0.10, CA:
β = 0
I Higher: amplitude of recessions
decreases






Prevention and mitigation: The Limits to Credit Growth

































Prevention and mitigation: The Limits to Credit Growth
Prevention and mitigation policies: The Limits to Credit Growth
Proposed regulations to limit excesses in banking (eg. Admati & Hellwig, 2013):
A. Default regulation: Capital ratio 12.5%, Reserve ratio 10%.
B. Banning bank dividend payouts→ Increases bank equity capital
C. Using non-risk-weighted capital ratios→ Prevents abuse of risk-weights
("risk-weight management optimization")
D. Cutting-off funding to all financially unsound firms→ Prevents leverage
E. Cutting-off funding to Ponzi firms only→ Prevents further leverage
F. Combined effect of BCD→ Does it help to prevent bubbles?
G. Combined effect of BCE→ Does it help to prevent bubbles?
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Prevention and mitigation policies: The Limits to Credit Growth



































































































cumulative loss of output
(amplitude & duration)






I To prevent large cumulative losses that follow from recessions,
it is required to cut-off funding to all financially unsound firms
(speculative and Ponzi firms).
I Mere capital ratios, and increasing them incrementally, do not
help to prevent credit bubbles.
I Imposing strict limits to growth on the excessive supply of
credit seems to work best to mitigate the severity of economic
downturns.
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Outlook & Future research
I Macroprudential regulation
I Systemic risk (SIFIs, SIBs)
I Bank-firm networks
I size effects
I balance sheet contagion
I Empirically-grounded bank behavior
I Credit quotas
I Credit rationing of SMEs
I Tighter integration of Basel III regulation





Scenario: Capital Adequacy Requirement
Output




















Bank activity (α = 2)

















Firm activity (α = 2)


























Scenario: Minimum Reserve Requirement
Output






















Bank activity (β = 0.50)

















Firm activity (β = 0.50)
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Scenario: Capital Adequacy Requirement
Output




















Bank activity (α = 2)

















Firm activity (α = 2)











































































































Scenario: Minimum Reserve Requirement
Output






















Bank activity (β = 0.50)

















Firm activity (β = 0.50)










































































































Number of illiquid firms
No constraint





















Capital constraint (α = 2)





















Liquidity constraint (β = 0.50)



























Number of active banks (unconstrained + constrained by equity/liquidity constraint)
No constraint

















Capital constraint (α = 2)

















Liquidity constraint (β = 0.5)























Firm E/A-ratio = 1/leverage
Capital constraint




































































































































































i − rb(∑hMbh +∑iMbi ) + rECB(Mbt −Dbt )







i + (1− τ)max[0,pibt ]−db(1− τ)max[0,pibt ]







Debt renegotiation is addressed by re-scaling the total debt Dft with a debt rescaling
parameter ϕ.
Target debt is given by:
D∗ = ϕAft with 0≤ ϕ ≤ 1 . (8)
After debt restructuring, the equity of the firm is now positive:
E∗ = (1−ϕ)Aft > 0. (9)
The new debt/equity-ratio is given by the constant D∗/E∗ = ϕ/(1−ϕ)< 1.







Debt-renegotiation is not necessary per se, rescaling of the debt is either based on the











with 0≤ ϕ ≤ 1 . (10)
The new debt/equity-ratio is given by the following piece-wise function:
D∗/E∗ =
{
ϕ/(1−ϕ) if ϕAft ≤ Dft
ϕ/(A/D−ϕ) if ϕAft > Dft .
(11)






I 〈Rf 〉nR : average revenues over previous nR months (nR = 3,6,12)















I Prevent liquidity hoarding by firms: Liquidity Buffer Stock
4. Dividend payout rule:
Div f =
{
d · 〈Πf 〉4 if M ft ≤ µ · 〈Rf 〉6
〈Πf 〉4 if M ft > µ · 〈Rf 〉6.
d = 0.7,µ = 0.5 (14)






5a. Full/Partial credit rationing is based on the (exogenously prescribed, ex ante)
constraints of the bank (CAR, CRR).
I Full rationing for CAR constraint:
¯`b
it =
 Lit if PDit ·Lit ≤ V
b
t
0 if 0≤ V bt ≤ PDit ·Lit
0 if V bt < 0.
(15)
I Partial rationing ("filling up to constraint") for CAR constraint:
¯`b
it =
 Lit if PDit ·Lit ≤ V
b
t
V bt /PDit if 0≤ V bt ≤ PDit ·Lit
0 if V bt < 0.
(16)
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